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By Jeffrey Bellin 
on Mar 25, 2021 at 5:15 pm
Against a backdrop of increasing national attention to police violence, the Supreme Court on
Thursday issued an opinion in a closely watched criminal-procedure case that clarifies the
meaning of the term “seizure.”
The Fourth Amendment provides important constitutional limits on abusive policing. These
protections take shape in two ways: limits on the introduction of evidence obtained
unconstitutionally, and civil suits against police who violate constitutional rights. But the
Fourth Amendment does not regulate policing generally. It only prohibits unreasonable
“searches and seizures.” That’s why the court’s ruling in Torres v. Madrid preserving a broad
understanding of the term “seizure” has important implications for regulating use of force by
police.
The case concerned an attempt by two New Mexico police officers to stop a car driven by
Roxanne Torres. The officers, who were trying to execute an arrest warrant for another
person, approached Torres and her parked car. When they attempted to speak with her,
Torres began driving away. Claiming to fear for their safety, the officers shot at the car,
injuring Torres, who then drove off. The question the justices resolved on Thursday was
whether this unsuccessful effort to stop Torres was a “seizure.” The officers claimed that
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people are seized only when they are stopped, while Torres kept going. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 10th Circuit agreed, dismissing Torres’ civil rights claim against the officers
for violating her Fourth Amendment rights.
In a 5-3 opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the majority reversed, concluding
that the officers seized Torres even though she subsequently fled. The outcome fits neatly
into the closest precedent, the 1991 case California v. Hodari D. In that case, the court
explained that “[t]he word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.”
(Emphasis added.) Pointing to this and other language in that case, the chief justice notes in
the Torres opinion that “[w]e largely covered this ground in California v. Hodari D.”
Roberts takes pains, however, to set the opinion on its own feet. Over a strident dissent, he
explains that whether or not the court is bound by stare decisis (the justices’ on-again-off-
again efforts to follow precedent), the justices “independently reach the same conclusions”
here. The majority opinion does so on two primary grounds: history and text.
History often comes up short in Fourth Amendment cases because policing as we know it was
almost non-existent in the 18th century. The majority insists, however, that this time, the
“cases and commentary speak with virtual unanimity on the question before us today.” But
the majority’s certainty rings hollow when it identifies “the closest decision” as the 1605
Countess of Rutland’s Case. In that case, the “serjeants-at-mace” were executing a debt-
collection judgment against Isabel Holcroft, an English noblewoman. The sergeants touched
Holcroft with (you guessed it) a mace, while exclaiming “we arrest you, madam.” The
majority explains that since an arrest is undoubtedly a “seizure” and getting touched with a
mace is like getting hit with a bullet, this history points the way toward today’s holding.
To be fair, the majority cites other old cases and treatise excerpts. But the dissent by Justice
Neil Gorsuch, which is joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, points out that
many cases of the era involved esoteric debt-collection practices. For example, debt collectors
could only break into debtors’ homes if they touched them first, often accomplishing this by
reaching in through a window! And all the cases involve the “laying on of hands” (or maces),
not guns or projectiles. Gorsuch scores rhetorical points when he scolds the majority for
“wandering about” the vast legal library of the common law, “randomly grabbing volumes off
the shelf, plucking out passages,” “scratching out bits” and crafting a “new pastiche.” But
Gorsuch’s argument is really a critique of the limits of originalism in this context, not the
particular rule announced in this case.
The majority’s textual interpretation is more straightforward. It recognizes that seizures most
obviously occur when a person is stopped. But the majority points out that it is not ruling
that Torres was seized from the point of the shooting onward. Instead, Roberts writes that
“the officers seized Torres for the instant that the bullets struck her.” (Emphasis added.)
Quoting Justice Antonin Scalia in Hodari D., the majority explains that a seizure “is a single
act, and not a continuous fact.” Thus, at the time the Constitution was adopted, “as now, an
3/4
ordinary user of the English language could remark: ‘She seized the purse-snatcher, but he
broke out of her grasp.’” In prior cases, the court similarly explained that a seizure is the
application of physical force that “in some way restrain[s] the liberty” of a person. Here,
considering that Torres was shot twice in the back and suffered physical injuries, it seems
reasonable to conclude that a restraint on her liberty, and thus a “seizure,” occurred.
The opinion offers two surprises. The most important is the majority’s broad holding. The
majority goes out of its way to craft a clear line that reaches beyond the facts of this case.
Both at the beginning and end of the opinion, the court announces: “We hold that the
application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if
the person does not submit and is not subdued.” Notice that this captures not just significant
restraints on liberty, but any touching at all. This is no oversight. Roberts downplays the
implications of this breadth by explaining:
While a mere touch can be enough for a seizure, the amount of force remains pertinent in
assessing the objective intent to restrain. A tap on the shoulder to get one’s attention will rarely
exhibit such an intent.
The majority is right that the intent requirement eliminates some minor touching from the
“seizure” definition. But not all. Small intrusions, such as taps on the shoulder, will constitute
seizures under the majority’s reasoning if they are intended as a prelude to restraint, even
when the tap-ee flees into a crowd. The dissent hints at other scenarios that may come within
the broad rule: laser beams that damage the retina, pepper spray that irritates the lungs, and
loud noises that damage a suspect’s ear drums. Those are harder cases than the one
presented here, and the court appears to (at least arguably) resolve them all with its broadly
worded holding.
The second surprise is the amount of disagreement. Since the case followed directly from
Hodari D., a 7-2 textualist/originalist opinion penned by Scalia, some observers expected the
court to come to greater agreement. Instead, the dissent spends 26 pages (nine more than the
majority opinion) explaining why Scalia and the court were wrong in 1991 and Roberts and
the majority are wrong in 2021. The dissent not only scoffs at the chief justices’ arguments
but accuses the majority of outcome-determinative reasoning: “an impulse that individuals
like Ms. Torres should be able to sue for damages.” Roberts offers a pained response: “There
is no call for such surmise. … [W]e simply agree with the analysis … set forth thirty years ago
by Justice Scalia, joined by six of his colleagues, rather than the competing view urged by the
dissent today.”
The bright-line rule announced by the court signals that remaining questions will now be the
responsibility of the lower courts. For Torres, her civil rights claims against the officers can
continue, although, as the majority notes, she will still need to overcome several other
obstacles – such as showing that the seizure was “unreasonable” and that the officers are not
entitled to qualified immunity – in order to ultimately prevail.
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